Must
Europe Harmonize Taxes? Not According to Baldwin and Krugman
Conventional
wisdom says that in a world of high capital mobility, closer economic
integration in the European Union demands tax harmonization. Otherwise,
there will be destructive tax competition, a ‘race to the bottom’
that will undermine the foundations of Europe's welfare states. This
view assumes that producers will move their capital to the lowest tax
country. But an opposing view, based on the ‘new economic
geography’, argues that rich countries with generous welfare states
may offer excellent infrastructure, established customer and supplier
bases, accumulated experience and well-trained workforces – the result
and the source of high taxes.
In
a CEPR Discussion Paper, Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman start by
examining traditional views on tax competition. There is the analogy of
competition among private sector firms, which can be good for society as
it promotes efficiency and reasonable prices. Governments are forced to
offer good public services and taxes no higher than what is necessary to
pay for them. But, on the other hand, competition may also result in
poor public services where citizens in competing jurisdictions suffer a
less inclusive society than they would wish. In these circumstances, tax
harmonization seems reasonable: competition could mean inadequate
services. And, since all are cutting taxes, no one gains.
But
real life is different. The authors show that while European integration
deepened, taxes in the core – Benelux, France, Germany and Italy –
rose. There has been no race to the bottom. It is not even the case that
integration has led to a narrowing of tax differentials. Rates have
always been higher in the core than the periphery, but any narrowing is
more like a ‘race to the top’, with rates in the core levelling off
while periphery rates converge upwards.
Baldwin
and Krugman use ‘new economic geography’ analysis to show why
reality differs from the traditional view. Again, the analogy between
private and public competition is useful. But instead of competition
between evenly matched firms, here competition is unbalanced – like
that between Microsoft and start-up firms. Microsoft charges a lot for
Windows, implying that a start-up could steal customers by producing a
cut-price Windows-like system. But Microsoft has the best people and can
buy or produce the best technology. Windows is therefore very attractive
and, despite its price, captures about 90% of the market. Microsoft can
afford the best people and technology because it has 90% of the market,
a circular causality that makes success self-sustaining. The circularity
also means that start-ups have little chance against Windows. So actual
competition in the market for operating systems is one-sided – but not
in the way people think. Microsoft worries about price-cutting by firms
that might enter the market if the price of Windows gets too high. But
start-up firms set prices without regard to Windows since they do not
compete head-to-head in the operating system market.
The
authors take an economic-geography view based on evidence that economic
concentration in core countries encourages continued geographical
concentration. Its implications for tax competition are clear. In
principle, periphery countries could vie for the core’s industrial
bases by charging low taxes. But, since the core has an agglomeration
advantage, even a zero tax rate might not induce firms to move.
Moreover, just as with Microsoft, the core can meet tax-cutting
challenges by lowering rates, so any challenge is likely to be futile.
Periphery countries will abandon attempts to compete, basing their tax
rates on criteria unrelated to tax competition. There is no point in
‘splitting the difference’ to achieve harmonization: a common rate
would maintain the core-periphery divide. With identical tax rates, the
desire of firms to be where other firms already are increases.
In
these circumstances, higher rates would be unambiguously bad for
periphery countries. And a scheme that forced core countries to lower
taxes and the quality of their public services would be a move in the
wrong direction. But there is a solution: a tax-rate floor just under
the initial rate of the low-tax countries. This would not harm those
countries but would rule out tax competition. Once the core countries
know there can be no tax war, they can raise rates closer to the level
that delivers the public services their citizens demand.
Notes
for Editors:
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The
Authors:
Richard
Baldwin is
Professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of International
Studies, Geneva and is also a Programme Director in CEPR’s
International Trade research programme. Paul
Krugman is Professor of Economics at Princeton University and is
also a Research Fellow in CEPR’s International Macroeconomics and
International Trade research programmes.
Agglomeration,
Integration and Tax Harmonization
Richard Baldwin and Paul
Krugman
CEPR
Discussion Paper
No 2630
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